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1. Introduction
Analyses of general equil ibrium with imperfect transactions take two
different forms. The first posits a schedule of transaction costs and makes
no further modifications in the Walrasian mechanism for attaining equili-
brium. (For examples, see Foley (1970), Hahn (1971) and more recently
Fischer (1982).) The second focuses on the problem of coordinating tran-
sactions, rather than upon their costs. Studies of search equilibria
(e.g., Diamond (1982, 1984, forthcoming), Mortensen (1982a, b), Weibull
(1982)) are examples of this second approach.
This paper continues the exploration of transactions coordination
models. In the models discussed here, transactions occur only at meetings
2
between a buyer and seller selected at random. As in the earlier work
cited above, we make the crucial simplifying assumption that individuals
explore transactions opportunities one at a time. In particular, economic
Diamond (1982) presented a search model of a production economy with
inventory levels restricted to and 1. Here, we consider continuous
rather than discrete levels of inventory. The introduction of continuous
inventories enables us to analyze price setting behavior. To deal with the
mathematical complexities that continuous inventories entail, we restrict
ourselves to discussion of an exchange economy. An interesting feature of
the analysis is the absence of the multiple equilibria that appear in the
production economy.
2
We make the simplifying assumption that traders pair at random in the
belief that the results of our analysis would not change significantly
under a regime of systematic search, such as the one discussed by Salop
(1973). We briefly consider matching technologies better than random ones
in Section 5. We do not consider repeat transactions.
October 17, 1983
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agents experience a Poisson process in which transactions opportunities
.irrive at a mean rate that depends on the transactions technology am
the collective behavior of all agents in the economy. We confine our
analysis to a pure exchange economy without credit, and to circumstances in
which there is an incentive to make transactions as rapidly as possible. A
deeper understanding of economies with this simple structure may help in
analyzing more complicated and realistic models in which credit, production
opportunities and intertemporal preferences play their appropriate roles.
Our objective is to describe price setting in a barter economy. We
elicit conditions for the existence of steady-state equilibria and analyze
optimal price setting by sellers. We show that when equilibria exist, they
are unique. Moreover, we conclude that the greater the capacity of the
transactions technology to allocate consumer goods, the lower the
equilibrium price. We also consider equilibrium distributions of inventory
for different arbitrarily set prices. We find that higher equilibrium
prices are associated with larger inventories.
In Section 2 we set out a simple, deterministic Robinson Crusoe
economy that introduces our basic technological assumptions. Throughout
this paper, we assume that inventory accumulates smoothly, and we model
consumption as a process in which discrete bundles of goods are consumed at
discrete times. In Section 3, we modify the Crusoe economy by introducing
a stochastic technology for converting inventory to consumable goods. We
model the arrival of consumption opportunities as a Poisson process and
calculate the steady state inventory distribution. Section 4 exhibits the
expected lifetime utility in our stochastic Crusoe world as a function of
3-
the level of initial inventories. Section 5 begins an equilibrium
analysis of a model of stochastic pairwise trading. We relate an
individual's ability to trade successfully to two factors controlled by the
assumed search technology: the rate at which trading partners are located;
and the equilibrium probability that a randomly selected partner has an
inventory sufficient to enable him to consummate a transaction. We discuss
the distribution of inventories and the aggregate lifetime utility in a
steady state equilibrium. The analysis in Section 5 assumes that trading
occurs at a relative price of one. In Section 6, we distinguish between
buying for consumption and selling for the purpose of increasing inventory.
This permits introduction of a (uniform) trading price different from unity
and enables us to compare steady states of the economy associated with
different trading prices. Higher trading prices result in greater stocks
of inventories and are in this sense less efficient. In Section 7 we
describe optimal individual price setting in an economy with many profit
maximizing firms. We show that price is higher the greater the incoming
flow of consumption goods relative to the potential capacity of the economy
to distribute goods to consumers. We conclude in Section 8 with a
discussion of directions for further research.
2. Robinson Crusoe Economy
To introduce the technology and display our notation, we begin with a
simple Robinson Crusoe world. Crusoe is immortal. He receives consumable
goods continuously from nature at a rate a. His consumption is not
-4-
continuous, however. He derives utility from consumption of discn
bundles of size y. Each consumption bundle carries u units of
3instantaneous utility. Crusoe has a lifetime utility that depends on his
consumption path, from the present to the indefinite future. If
consumption occurs at discrete times t, , t
?
, ..., lifetime utility is
W = u Z e"
rt
i
, (2.1)
i
where r is a positive utility discount factor. Given positive r, it is
desirable that consumption take place as early in history as possible.
Our assumptions enable us to specify Crusoe's inventory of goods as a
function of time. Let Crusoe's initial endowment of goods, x~, lie between
and y. On our assumptions, inventory grows linearly at the constant rate
a until it reaches y. Crusoe then consumes a bundle of size y, and his
inventory drops to zero. Crusoe's inventory at time t is therefore
x(t) = x
Q
+ at - y Int((x Q+at)/y), (2.2)
where Int(z) is the integer part of z. On the other hand, if Crusoe's
initial inventory exceeds y, he draws it down (at an infinite rate) until
it drops below y, after which the pattern described by (2.2) is repeated.
From (2.2), observe that in the Crusoe universe there is an equal
probability of an inventory level x at any value between and y, at any
time picked at random in the distant future. We may choose the equivalent
3
In later sections, we introduce transactions and assume utility in an
amount u accrues when there is a successful purchase.
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interpretation thai, in a steady state, there is a population of <.r\r
(normalized to one) whose inventories are distributed uniformly between
and y, with mean y/2.
One may also calculate Crusoe's lifetime utility W(x
n
) as a function
of his initial inventory, x~. Let x =0. Because it takes y/a units of
time to accumulate a consumable bundle of size y, and consumption is
repeated at equal intervals y/a into the future, (2.1) tells us Crusoe's
lifetime util ity is
W(0) = u e-^l-e-^ 3 ]" 1 . (2.3a)
If x
n
lies between and y, the consumption path is the same as it would be
if Crusoe started with zero inventory at a time x„/a earlier. Thus,
W(x
Q )
= W(0)exp(rx /a) x
Q <y,
(2.3b)
and W is convex between and y. If x
n
is greater than y, we have
W(x
Q )
= u Int(x
Q /y)
+ W(x -ylnt(x /y))
= u Int(x
Q/y)
+ W(0)exp[r(x -yInt(x /y))/a]. (2.3c)
From (2.3c), we observe that W(x
n
) - u Int(x
n
/y) is a periodic function.
Lifetime utility W(x„), as specified by (2.3), is therefore neither concave
nor convex in x
n
, a characteristic of the models analyzed in this paper.
As in the standard continuous consumption model, the one-person Crusoe
economy is equivalent to an Arrow-Debreu economy. Assume trade is
instantaneous. Let the population be composed of identical agents who do
not choose to consume what they themselves are capable of producing. Then,
under the assumption that each consumption bundle is composed of y units
from the same supplier, trade takes place in discrete
-6-
bundles of size y. Accumulation of y units of inventory then leads to the
inventory and consumption behavior described by (2.1-3). The presence of a
present discounted val je, lifetime budget constraint does not change this
story, but effectively introduces an interest rate r as a consequence of
linear intertemporal indifference between present and future consumption.
In Sections 5-7, we explore models in which trade is not
instantaneous, and the transactions rate is endogenous. Our assumption of
an endogenous transactions rate distinguishes the work presented here from
4
conventional Arrow-Debreu analyses. As a prelude, we consider in Section
3 a stochastic variant of the Crusoe economy that leads conveniently to the
more complex analysis that follows.
3. Stochastic Crusoe Economy
We now change the underlying technology to allow for a preparatory
stochastic process before consumption can occur and again explore inventory
behavior over time. As in Section 2, we let inventories increase
continuously at a constant rate, a. We add, however, the new assumption
that a bundle of y units of a good must be processed in home production
before it is ready for consumption. The home production process has the
following form: each bundle of y units is set aside for ripening; only one
bundle can be processed at a time; ripening is stochastic; and the arrival
of ripeness obeys a Poisson law with rate b. Consumption takes place
immediately after a bundle is ripe. This stochastic Crusoe economy is
4
Not every .model with a finite transactions time differs from an
Arrow-Debreu model. With an exogenous distribution of the time needed to
deliver goods to the market, one can distinguish produced from marketed
goods and apply the standard analysis in terms of marketed goods. An
interesting model of this sort has been studied by Lucas and Prescott
(1974).
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equivalent to an Arrow-Debreu economy in which ripening represents a
stochastic technology for delivering goods to consumers, and "trade" is
instantaneously coordinated once an agent reaches a market.
In the stochastic Crusoe economy, an inventory less than y grows at
the rate a. Once y is exceeded, there is a probability per unit time, b,
of a stepwise drop by an amount y. We introduce scarcity into the economy
by assuming
a<by. (3.1)
Equation (3.1) tells us individuals are capable of consuming more rapidly
than the rate at which inventories grow. It will be shown explicitly
below that this scarcity condition is necessary if the economy is to
possess a stationary equilibrium. The quantity a/by is the ratio of the
rate of inflow of endowment to the potential rate at which goods can be
ripened if sufficient capacity is available. In a steady state, the rate
of ripening must equal the rate at. which endowment arrives. Therefore, we
shall refer to a/by in the discussion below as the capacity utilization
ratio.
Assume the economy consists of a large number of individuals, distin-
guished from each other only by their inventory holdings. Denote by F(x)
the steady-state equilibrium distribution of inventories, with associated
density F'(x). Consider the flow of agents with given inventories along
the (positive) x-axis. By definition, all contributions to this flow sum
to zero in a steady state. We shall derive the equilibrium condition and
solve for F(x).
At inventory level x, the flow of agents to the right is aF'(x). On
the other hand, the flow to the left, is given by the rate b times the total
number of agents to the right of x with inventories capable of ripening and
therefore of dropping below x. This is b[F(x+y) - max[F(x) ,F(y)]] , the
number of inventory holdings at least as large as y, lying in the interval
(x,x+y). Equating rightward and leftward flows, we observe that the
5
equilibrium distribution of inventories satisfies
aF'(x) = bF(x+y) - bF(y); x<y (3.2a)
aF'(x) = bF(x+y) - bF(x). x>y (3.2b)
These are linear, first-order differential equations with advanced
arguments. We seek a continuous solution F(x) such that F(0)=0, and
F(°") = l- Given these boundary conditions, the solution is unique.
Equation (3.2b) is independent of (3.2a). Yet the solution of (3.2a)
depends on the solution of (3.2b). Thus, we attack (3.2b) first.
kx
Substituting e
v
for F(x) in (3.2b), we see that F(x) has exponential form
provided the rate constant k satisfies the characteristic equation
ak = b(e ky -l). (3.3)
By using Rouche's Theorem (e.g., Titchmarsh, 1932, chapt. 3), or simply by
diagramming the complex k-plane, we find that (3.3) has only one (real)
root k* with negative real part. This suggests the trial solution
5
More general non-steady paths are described by a Fokker-Planck (or
forward Kolmogorov) equation of the form
3f(x,t;x
Q )
3f (x,t;x
Q )
=
-a
3t 9X
+ b[f(x+y,t;x
Q )
- 9(x-y)f(x,t;x )],
where f(x,t;x„) is the probability that an agent with initial inventory x
n
has inventory x at time t, and where 0(z)=l for positive z, and 0(z)=O for
z negative. This equation is analyzed in Yell in and Diamond (1983), where
we. consider the welfare consequences of an improvement in the search
technology.
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F(x) H(constant)exp(k*x). Making this substitution in (3.2b), we obtain
F(x) = 1 - [l-F(y)] exp[k*(x-y)]. x>y (3.4)
The boundary value F(y) is set by solving (3.2a) and enforcing continuity.
Reading off F(x+y) from (3.4) and substituting the result in (3.2a), v/e
have the density
F'(x) = (b/a)[l-F(y)][l-e k
*
x
J. x<y (3.5)
Integrating (3.5), the associated distribution is
F(x) = (b/(ak*))[l-F(y)]U-e k
*
x
+k*x], x<y (3.6)
where we have used F(0)=0. Setting x=y in (3.6) and using (3.3), one
observes that continuity of F(x) requires
l-F(y) = a/(by). (3.7)
The quantity l-F(y) is the probability that a randomly chosen individual is
not stocked out. Equation (3.7) therefore restates our scarcity assumption
(3.1) in probability terms and confirms that (3.1) is required for the
existence of a steady state equilbrium.
In Figure 1, we have plotted the density F'(x). From (3.3) and (3.8),
one observes that apart from an overall scale factor y, F'(x) is a one-para-
meter family of density functions specified by the capacity utilization
ratio z=a/(by). Differentiating (3.3) with respect to z, we have
Indeed, an intuitive argument that assumes there is a steady state
equilibrium leads directly to (3.7). One observes that in in a steady
state, (3.7) is equivalent to the statement that the flow of goods into
inventory, a, equals the expected flow of goods out of inventory,
by[l-F(y)]. Equation (3.7) can also be derived formally by integrating
(3.2) over the interval (0,°°).
•10-
d(k*y)/dz = k*y(l-z+zk*y)
_1
> 0. (2.
Equation (3.8) implies that if the inflow of goods, a, increases, the rate
constant k* decreases in absolute value, and the distribution of inventory
holdings acquires a flatter right-hand tail. This behavior is shown in
Figure 1, where F' is plotted for two different values of z. On the other
hand, an increase in the expected outflow, by, increases the absolute value
of k* and shrinks the right-hand tail. A change in y accompanied by a
proportional change in a corresponds to a change in the units in which
goods are measured. From (3.3), such a change leads to an inverse pro-
portional change in k*, in which k*y remains constant.
If we use (3.4,5) to compute the mean inventory, we obtain
x = y/2 - 1/k*. (3.9)
The term y/2 in (3.9) represents goods in process. If b were indefinitely
large, an agent's inventory level would drop to zero immediately on reaching
y, and the steady-state mean inventory would be y/2, as in the deterministic
world of Section 2. Equation (3.9) shows that the consequence of assuming
a finite transaction time is lower efficiency, manifested by a shift of
mean inventory upward by -1/k* from the deterministic value. From (3.8)
and (3.9) we observe that the more rapid ripening caused by a larger
meeting rate b decreases average inventories, while a greater input rate of
goods, a, increases average inventories.
4. Expected Lifetime Utility
We turn now to an evaluation of consumption patterns in terms of
-11-
lifetime utilities. We discount utility as before at a constant rate r.
We will show that, as in Section 2, the expected present discounted value
of lifetime utility is neither concave nor convex as a function of initial
inventories. We give an explicit expression for lifetime utility for
completeness. No further use is made of this expression in this paper; we
reserve detailed welfare analysis for separate treatment.
To fix ideas, we first compute the present discounted value of the
lifetime utility of an agent whose initial inventory is infinite. Given
our assumptions, such an individual takes advantage of every consumption
opportunity. The probability of an act of consumption in an infinitesimal
-rt
time interval dt is b dt, and the payoff is u e . Assuming an initial
infinite endowment, the expected present discounted value of utility is
oo
W(«) = bu/ e" rt dt = bu/r. (4.1)
To compute W(x
Q )
for a finite initial endowment x
Q , we express
lifetime utility as the summed product of the Poisson jump probability
-rt
b dt, the payoff [u e ], and the probability,
T f(x,t;x
Q )
dx,
that an agent with initial endowment x~ has an inventory greater than y at
time t:
oo oo
W(x
n )
= bu / e"
rt
/ f(x,t;x n ) dx dt. (4.2)
A derivation of the results of this section is presented in Yellin
and Diamond (1983)
12-
Using (4.2) and the homogeneity and additivi ty of the underlying
stochastic process, one derives differential equations that determine W(x):
rW(x) = aW'(x); x<y (4.3a)
rW(x) = aW'(x) + b[u+W(x-y )-W(x)] . x>y (4.3b)
Equations (4.3) are dynamic programming relations. They equate the
discount rate times expected lifetime utility to the expected flow of
utility plus the expected value of capital gains from changes in inventory.
The asymptotic limit W(°°) given by (4.1) is reconfirmed on inspection of
(4.3b). In Figure 2, we exhibit the shape of W(x), as given by (4.3).
Note the monotone increasing behavior as x increases, and also the upper
bound on W that results from the scarcity condition (3.1).
For completeness, we give the explicit solution of (4.3) for W(x). By
inspection, the solution of (4.3a) is the simple (convex) exponential
W(x) = W(0)e rx/a
,
x<y (4.4a)
just as in (2.3b). Since W is convex over the region x<y, increasing and
bounded above, it is neither convex nor concave. For x greater than y, we
may integrate (4.3b) stepwise to obtain
W(x) = A. + W(0)e r(x"^ )/a +(-b/a) j ^(ml^C (x-jy) m e (r+b) (x"^ )/a
,
J
m=0 J_m
jy < x < (j+l)y. (4.4b)
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In (4.4b),
A. = (bu/r) [1- (b/(r+b)) J ]. (4.4c)
J
The continuity of W(x) in x yields
-(b/a)C
1
= W(0)(e ry/a -l) - ub/(r+b); (4.4d)
(-b/a) j+1 Cj+1 = -u[b/(r+b)]
j+1
+ W(0Re ry/a -l]
+e <
r+b)y/a (W Vc. v>! . (4.4e)
m=0 J
"m
There remains the unknown lifetime utility, W(0), of an agent whose
initial endowment is zero. From (4.2) we obtain after some calculation
(Yell in and Diamond, 1983)
W(0) = e" ry/aW(y) = u e
" ry/a [l-e" ry/a ]
_1
[(l-e" Q )/(r/b+l-e" Q )] , (4.5)
where Q is the unique positive root of the characteristic equation
e"
Q
-l = r/b - (a/by)Q (4.6)
of (4.3b). On comparing (4.5) with (2.3a), we observe that introduction of
a finite transactions rate results in the appearance of the factor
1-e /(r/b+l-e ), which lowers W(0) below the deterministic value (2.3a).
This is consistent with the efficiency loss that must follow from the
introduction of a stochastic process in which transactions are not
instantaneous. From (4.6), as the meeting rate b increases, Q increases,
the new stochastic factor approaches 1, and W(0) tends asymptotically to
the Crusoe value (2.3a).
Se.irch Economy
Rather than placing Robinson Crusoe in an Arrow-Debi nnomy where
trade is perfectly and instantaneously coordinated, let us now place him in
an exchange economy where the problem of finding a trading partner replaces
the ripening process. To begin, let us assume that meetings between pairs
of agents represent two independent random draws from the population, and
that such meetings occur at the rate b'/2 per capita. Each such trade
permits both traders to consume. Then each individual experiences meetings
at a rate b' -- the number of agents per meeting, 2, times the meeting rate
per capita, b'/2. On the other hand, not every transaction can be
consummated, for each individual meets with a partner who has sufficient
inventory to trade in a fraction [l-F(y)] of his meetings. Thus, each
agent experiences an effective arrival rate of trading partners
b = [l-F(y)Jb\ (5.1)
Equation (5.1) shows that while b depends on the exogenous technology
for bringing agents together, it also depends on the endogenous
distribution of inventory holdings. In particular, in the Arrow-Debreu
economy analogous to the Robinson Crusoe economy analysed in Sections 3 and
4, the Poisson parameter b, governing the time it takes to deliver goods to
market, is exogenous. In a search model, however, success in finding a
trading partner is sensitive to the availability of partners, and the
Poisson rate b is partly endogenous.
If we assume, as in Sections 2 and 3, that agents continuously receive
goods at the rate a, then the steady-state distribution of inventories
satisfies (cf. (3.2))
aF'(x) = b'[l-F(y)][F(x+y) • F(y)]; x<y
aF'(x) - b'[l-F(y)][F(x+y) - F(x)]. x>y (5.2b)
Wo analyze (5.2) below.
One can also generalize to search technologies that lead to higher
probabilities for successful transactions than does random pairing. Let
the fraction of meetings that result in successful transactions be h. In
general, h will be an increasing function of U-F(y)], the fraction of the
population holding inventory greater than the minimum necessary for
entering into transactions. If all [l-F(y)] individuals capable of trading
have equal probabilities of a successful pairing, then each agent
experiences trading opportunities at an arrival rate
b = b'h(l-F(y))/[l-F(y)]. (5.3)
Given random pairings, h = [l-F(y)] . Thus, the presence of agents unable
to trade slows the trading process. If, on the other hand, the search
technology is such that those unable to trade do not slow the search for
trading partners, h = [l-F(y)]. These are polar cases. We may plausibly
expect h(x) to be a function (defined on the unit interval) that lies below
x and above x . In terms of h, the equilibrium relations (5.2) become
aF'(x) = b'h(l-F(y))[l-F(y)]- 1 [F(x+y) - F(y)]; x<y (5.4a)
aF'(x) = b'h(l-F(y))[l-F(y)]" 1 [F(x+y) - F(x)]. x>y (5.4b)
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We now analyze the random search model described by (5.2). We will
show that the solution of (5.2) is identical to the Crusoe solution
(3.4,6), provided that the rate parameter b in Section 3 is replaced by the
parametric combination [ab'/y] , and that the scarcity condition a<b'y is
imposed. It is natural to ask whether by proper choice of parameters one
can find a solution of the linear equations (3.2) that satisfies the
nonlinear equations (5.2). Recall from (3.7) that continuity of F(x)
requires
1 - F(y) = a/(by). (5.5)
Combining (5.5) with the rate relation (5.1), we obtain
b = [ab'/y]*. (5.6)
Making the replacement (5.6) in (3.3, 3.4, 3.6), and substituting the
resulting distribution F(x) into (5.2), one confirms that a solution for
the nonlinear random matching problem has been obtained, provided a<b'y.
We state without proof that any nontrivial solution of (5.2) is unique.
Other search technologies may be analyzed by combining (5.5) with the rate
relation (5.3).
One may extend this analysis to aggregate lifetime utility. In steady
state equilibrium, the aggregate per capita consumption rate equals a, the
aggregate per capita incoming flow of goods. Thus, the aggregate per
capita flow of utility is ua/y, a quantity that is independent of the
meeting rate b 1 and, more generally, of the pairing technology h(x) intro-
duced in (5.3). The present discounted value of aggregate instantaneous
utility, W
fi
, equals expected lifetime utility summed over all agents.
Therefore, in a steady state equilibrium we have
-17-
W
n
= ua/(yr) = / W(x) F'(x)dx, (5.7)
u
where W(x) is the individual expected lifetime utility given an initial
inventory x, and F(x) is the solution of (5.4).
Though steady state aggregate lifetime utilities are independent of
the arrival rate b', economies that have different search technologies (and
therefore different arrival rates b') differ from each other in important
ways. In particular, the equilibrium distribution of inventory holdings,
F(x), differs among such economies. Recalling (3.8-9), we confirm from
(5.6) that average inventories, y/2-l/k*, increase as the exogenous part,
b 1
, of the rate of meetings decreases. The expected lifetime utility from
holding a given initial inventory level also varies with the meeting rate.
In particular, expected lifetime utility increases with an increased
meeting rate, at each level of initial inventory. This can be reconciled
with the constant average utility (5.7) by observing that the steady state
distribution of inventory holdings shifts to the left for successively
larger meeting rates.
6. Trading Prices
We now modify the model of Section 5 so as to allow consideration of
price-setting behavior. In this section we calculate the steady state
distribution of inventories for arbitrary uniform prices. In Section 7 we
analyze equilibria with many profit maximizing firms.
Thus far we have assumed that the only reason for a failure to trade
o
is that either potential partner to a transaction is stocked out. Under
o
Therefore we have assumed the double coincidence of wants is always
satisfied.
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that dssumption, we have imposed the rule that all trade takes place 01
one- tor-one basis -- with each partner trading and receiving y units of the
universal consumption good. If, however, we impose instead the rules of
specific bargaining theories such as those of Raiffa or Nash (cf. Luce and
Raiffa (1957)), then trade cannot be one-for-one except under special
circumstances. In particular, given the Raiffa bargaining solution, both
parties to any trade have equal gains of utility. However, in one-for-one
trade between two agents with inventories x, and x~, equal utility gains
imply
u + W(xry) - W( Xl ) = u + W(x 2 -y) - W(x 2 ). (6.1)
The function W is non-linear. For any x,
,
(6.1) therefore can be satisfied
only for exceptional values of x~, in particular for x, = x
?
.
The straightforward generalization of our model of one-for-one trade
is to allow different prices in different trades. This would reflect the
reality of price distributions. Such a generalization greatly complicates
the analysis, however, and we take an alternative approach. We explore a
simple institutional setting in which equilibrium is achieved at a uniform
relative price different from unity. When trade occurs, y units are
"purchased" for consumption, and the buyer "pays" p units which are added
to the inventory of the seller. The inventories of any two traders are
therefore assumed to be perfect substitutes in future trades. To maintain
the price interpretation, we further assume p is greater than y. Any trade
now involves one randomly selected buyer and one randomly selected seller.
Thus, one can thfnk of the population of economic agents as a set of pairs,
with one member of each pair available to buy and one to sell.
With only these changes in the model, individual inventories would be
subject to a Poisson process compounded from distinct stochastic buying and
selling behaviors. Inventories would have jump increases by steps p-y, and
jump decreases by steps p, in addition to increases at a constant rate due
to the arrival of endowment. The presence of jump increases greatly
complicates the analytic problems discussed in Sections 3-5, and we make no
attempt to analyze such a two-jump process. Instead, to retain the picture
of uniform inventory growth and discrete inventory outflows, we simplify
further by introducing an intermediary that smooths increases in inventory
by providing insurance against the random proceeds of the selling process.
We shall refer to our intermediating institution as the "firm." It
operates under the following rules. Agents receive inventory from nature
at a constant rate a'. Also, every agent is employed by the firm and
receives "wages" at a rate a-a'. Each agent therefore experiences a
continuous growth of inventory at the overall rate a, which is now
endogenous. The firm sets the price at which its workers offer goods for
trade. It also sets its wage rate a-a' equal to the flow of profits per
worker. Wages are paid independent of an agent's success in selling and
whether or not she or he possesses the minimum inventory necessary to
g
consummate transactions. Furthermore, inventories are made available for
trade, even though there is no return to making them available. In
9
If wages depend on whether inventories are above or below y, purchase
and consumption by an agent with inventory between y and y+p will lower
subsequent wages. Therefore, in order to compute the equilibrium distri-
bution of inventories, it becomes necessary to determine the set of
inventory levels at which consumption opportunities are taken.
To compensate separately for labor and for inventories would
introduce an interest rate into the model.
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addition, provided his inventory exceeds p, an agent expet
tunii ies to purchase bundles of size y for consumption at the price p,
times set by a Poisson process characterized by the rate b, which is
determined endogenously. Each act of consumption, as before, results in
instantaneous utility u. Finally, we shall assume that profits from a
sale, p-y, are instantly transmitted to the firm's central accounting
office for redistribution as part of the wage flow a-a'. Then the dis-
tribution of inventory available for sale is identical to the distribution
12
of inventory available for purchase. Indeed, the distributions of
inventory and the levels of expected utility are the same as those analyzed
in Sections 3 and 4, except that price p plays the role of commodity bundle
size y. Inventories grow continuously at the rate a, while decreasing in
jumps of size p at times determined by a Poisson process with rate b.
To proceed with the steady state analysis, we consider the
determination of b, which is the endogenous arrival rate of purchase
opportunities. The expected rate of successful purchases is [1-F(p)]b. In
general, this rate depends on the percentage of agents who are able to buy,
[l-F(p)], and the percentage able to sell, U-F(y)]. As discussed in
Section 5, we may write the fraction of meetings that are successful as
h(l-F(p) ,1-F(y) ) , and define the rate of meetings per capita as b'. Then we
This model can be reinterpreted as a monetary structure in which
paper money is backed one hundred percent by loans collateralized on
inventories, and no interest is paid on these "deposits." We leave the
analysis of a more general economy with interest rates for later work. The
introduction of interest greatly complicates the equations for the
distribution of- inventory holdings.
12
In a more general model with delays in transmitting goods within the
firm which are different from delays in transmitting purchasing ability,
the equilibrium conditions determining inventory available for sale differ
from those determining inventory available to finance purchases.
•?)
have the rate relationship
[1-F(p)]b = b'h(l-F(p),l-F(y)). (6.2)
Consider the following two polar cases. First, the ability to find a
supplier may be independent of the distribution of available inventories.
This occurs if demanders are instantly redirected to suppliers who are
adequately stocked. Then h = l-F(p), and
(A) b = b". (6.3)
On the other hand, meetings between pairs of agents may be purely random,
without redirection to adequately stocked sellers. In this case, h is the
product of l-F(p) and l-F(y), and we have
(B) b = Ll-F(y)]b'. (6.4)
It is plausible that the dependence of b on F(x) lies between these two
polar extremes, with some delay in finding an adequately stocked supplier,
but better than random search.
The two polar possibilities, (A,B) lead to different relationships
between inventories and prices. We will now show that the more efficient
technology A described by (6.3) results in mean inventory proportional to
price. On the other hand, the less efficient technology B described by
(6.4) results in less than proportional growth of mean inventory as a
function of price. We begin by analyzing the dependence of the distri-
bution of inventories on the endogenous rate b. The resulting equations
hold for both search technologies.
The trading rules of the firm introduced above tell us that the price
p plays the role of the consumption bundle size y in the equilibrium
analysis [cf. (3.2-8)] that fixes the inventory distribution F(x). In
particular, the condition (3.7) for the continuity of F(x) tells us that
the fraction <>f agents who are able to buy satisfies
l-F(p) = a/(bp). (6.5)
Replacing y by p and x by y in (3.6) and using (6.5), the fraction of the
population able to sell is
l-F(y) = l-[pk*]
_1
[l-e k
*
y+k*y], (6.6)
where k* is the unique real, negative root of the characteristic equation
ak* = b(e k
*
p
-l). (6.7)
Furthermore, from (3.8), mean inventory becomes
x = p/2-l/k*. (6.8)
We shall use (6.7) to compute the change in mean inventory (6.8) -- in
particular in -1/k* -- as p increases.
To proceed, we first eliminate the endogenous growth rate a from
(6.7). The rate of growth of inventories satisfies the firm's budget
constraint. This is the requirement that wages equal profits, which here
takes the form
a-a' = (p-y)b[l-F(p)] = a(p-y)/p, (6.9)
where we have used (6.5). From (6.9), we see that the ratio
a/p = a'/y (6.10)
13
is independent of price. Therefore, the real wage,
13
Equation (6.10) is equivalent to the assertion that in a steady
state the aggregate accumulation of goods equals the aggregate consumption
rate: a' = b[l-F(p)]y = ay/p.
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(a-a')y/p = a'(p-y)/p, rises monotonical ly from zero at p=y. Using (6.10),
the characteristic equation (6.7) becomes
a'k*p/y - b(e k
*
p
-l). (6.11a)
Technology A. Given the more efficient technology described by (6.3),
b is independent of p and may be replaced by b' in (6.11a), yielding
a7(b'y) [e k
*
p
-l]
_1
(k*p) = 1. (6.11b)
Comparing (6.11b) with the Crusoe result (3.3), we observe that with search
technology A, the present model differs from the model of Section 3 by the
replacement of the Crusoe rate constant k* by the new value k*y/p.
Introduction of the uniform relative price, p, therefore shifts the entire
inventory distribution to the right. Moreover, (6.11b) tells us that for
fixed a'/(b'y), k*p is fixed and negative, and (-k*~ ) is proportional to
p. The mean inventory level, p/2-l/k*, therefore is proportional to price.
Reinterpretation in money terms lends insight into the efficiency
properties of a steady state economy mediated by search technology A. With
either technology, this model can be reinterpreted as describing an economy
with commodity-backed money, in which commodities are available for sale,
but money, rather than commodities, is used for purchases. With technology
A, essentially the same steady state as under the pure inventory model can
be achieved by introducing money that is only partially backed by
commodities. In particular, with technology A, buyers are instantly
redirected to adequately stocked suppliers, and the arrival rate of
consumption opportunities therefore is not affected by inventories in
excess of y/2 per capita -- the minimum mean inventory necessary for the
accumulation process prior to "ripening" described in Section 3.
Therefore, with partially unbacked money, the same distribution of money
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holdings as given by (6.11b) can be achieved, while restrictii
inventory to y/2. This is the familiar gain of efficiency from eliminating
stocks of commodities whose only role is to back the money supply.
Technology C. In the model of random meetings described by (6.4), the
relationships among price, the shape of the inventory distribution, and the
mean inventory level are more complex. The exponential rate k* decreases
with p for low prices sufficiently near the zero-profit point p=y, but
increases with p for higher prices. Mean inventory increases monotonical ly
in p. In contrast to the behavior that obtains with technology A, average
inventories rise less than in proportion to p.
A heuristic explanation is as follows. The introduction of a price p
(greater than y) effectively divides the population of agents into three
groups. These groups have inventories: (I) less than y; (II) between y and
p; (III) greater than p. For p=y, no agents fall into Group II, and the
inventory distribution is therefore identical to the two-group distribution
(3.4, 3.6), as modified by the parametric substitution (5.6) derived in
Section 5. For p greater than y, two effects increase the net meeting rate
b, tending to increase the absolute magnitude of the rate constant k* and,
therefore, to shift the inventory distribution above p to the left. First,
wages are positive, speeding up the movement from Group I to Group II.
Second, whatever the price level, members of Group II are unable to
purchase goods, and are therefore prevented from dropping into Group I.
However, for p sufficiently large with respect to y, we pass to a regime in
which Group I is negligible. Thus, for large p there is a two-group
dynamics in which p effectively plays the role of y in the model of Section
-25-
3, and -1/k* is proportional to p, just as it is when ienl
technology A is in operation.
Lemma 1. When search technology B is in operation, the exponential
constant k*(p) decreases as p increases from the zero-profit point p=y,
reaches a minimum at some value p=p
Q ,
and then increases for all greater p.
On the other hand, the quantity pk* decreases monotonical ly in p,
approaching a constant (negative) value for sufficiently large p.
Proof. Lemma 1 can be confirmed analytically by substituting (6.4) and
(6.6) into (6.11a), and using (6.7), deriving an implicit equation for k*:
l-F(y) = [a'/(b , y)][e k
*
p
-l]" 1 (k*p) = l-( l-e k
*
y+k*y)/(pk*)
. (6.12)
Rewrite the last equality in (6.1?) in the form
^(k'y) " R
2
(k*p), (6.13)
where
R
T
(x) = 1 + x - e
x
; (6.14a)
R
2
(x) = x[l + (a7(b'y))x(l-e x )
-1
]. (6.14b)
From (6.14a), we observe that R-,(x) is negative, monotone increasing and
concave for nonpositive x, with R, (0)=0. From (6.14b), provided the
scarcity condition z'=a'/b'y <1 holds, R (x) is convex and has two roots,
one at zero, the other at a negative value greater than -1/z'. Moreover,
By differentiating (6.14b), we obtain
R
2
'(x) = [a'/(b'y)](l-e x )" 3 [2(l-ex +xe x )
2
+x
2
e
x (l-e x )] > 0,
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RA(x) is positive at the zero-profit point p=y, where R,(x)=R
? (x).
These characteristics of the R.(x) are shown in Figure 3. The
derivative dk*/dp obtained from (6.13), k*RA[yRj -pRA]~ , is negative
(positive) when the derivative R~(k*p) is positive (negative). Therefore,
dk*/dp is negative for p sufficiently near the zero-profit point p=y, as
Lemma 1 asserts. For sufficiently large p, the solution k*p of (6.13)
occurs where R~(k*p) is negative, and dk*/dp is positive. The derivative
of k*p with respect to p, k*yRj[yRj-pR,!,]~ , is positive, consistent with
the less than proportional growth of -1/k* anticipated above.
The dependence of k* and k*p on p is exhibited in Figure 4.
Lemma 2. The price response of mean inventory,
dx/dp = 1/2 + k*" 2dk*/dp, (6.15)
is positive for all allowed p.
Proof. One confirms this result by differentiating (6.13). We have
?
dk* R' (k*p)
dp k*y Rj(k*y) - k*p R£(k*p)
= R£(k*p)[k*y(l-e k
*
y
) - k*pR£(k*p)]
_1
. (6.16)
To prove that mean inventory increases with price, we must show that
k*~ dk*/dp is greater than
-i. From (6.15), the critial region in p is the
One checks the sign of R
?
at p=y by using R,(x)=R
?
(x) to eliminate
(a'/(b'y)) from the expression for RA(x), obtaining
RA(x) = x
_1
[x(l+e x ) + 2(l-e
x
)]
at the zero-profit point.
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one in which dk*/dp is negative. Recalling Figure 3, this is the region in
which R' is positive. Differentiating (6.16) with respect to k*y, we have
sign _!__ [ k*~2 dk_*] = sign [k*y[(l-e k
*
y
)
2
R"/R' + e k
*
y R']]. (6.17)
d(k*y) dp
Since R~ is convex, the sign of (6.17) is negative, and k* dk*/dp takes
its lowest value at the zero-profit point p=y. From (6.13), we may write
x 2
a'/(b'y) r [(l-e )/x] at p=y. Substituting this result in (6.16), we have
2
,* l+e
x
+2(l-e x )/x
k*^-^- =
,
(6.18)
dp -2xe-2(l-e x )
where p=y, and x=k*p. It is straightforward to confirm that the right hand
side of (6.18) exceeds
-I for all negative x, and thus that mean inventory
increases monotonical ly with p.
Lemma 3. With technology B, the net meeting rate b increases with p.
Proof. From (6.12) and (6.4), we have
-(kp)'(l- e kp + kp e kp )
d/dp log b(p) = d/dp log [l-F(y)] = . (6.19)
-kp(l-e kp )
By inspection, the denominator of (6.19) is positive. From Lemma 1, -(kp)'
k n k n
is also positive. The remaining quantity (1-e H+kpe p ) is positive also:
it is monotone decreasing for negative kp and vanishes at kp=0.
7. Price Determination
To close this analysis, we study a many-firm model in which we
1 c
derive profit maximizing, equilibrium prices. We separately analyze *>
existence of an equilibrium price for each of the search technoloi
(A,B), and we also examine the dependence of the equilibrium prices on the
capacity utilization ratio z'=a'/b'y. It will be shown that the condition
on z' for the existence of an optimal price is more stringent than the
scarcity condition of Section 3 that the capacoty utilization ration is
less than 1.
Let us assume there are a large number of identical, though
independent firms that have no price reputations, and that consumers
solicit prices at random, one at a time. With sufficiently many firms,
there is no link between profits and perceived demand. Thus, firms will
set a price, p', that maximizes aggregate perceived profits (see, e.g.,
Burdett and Judd (1983), Diamond (1971)). Perceived profits per arriving
customer equal (p
1
-y ) [ 1 -F(
p
' )] , where the distribution of purchasing power,
F, satisfies (3.4) and (3.6), with p substituted for y. That is, perceived
profits equal the product of the profit per sale and the fraction of
arriving customers who are potential active buyers.
The first-order condition for profit maximization,
l/(p'-y) = F'(p')/[1-F(p')]
,
(7.1)
instructs each firm to set a price that precisely balances its marginal
increase in revenue with the marginal reduction in its pool of buyers due
to a price increment. Such a balance can be achieved only if the
We assume,- as above, that wages equal profits and do not consider
more complicated wage contracts. Worker inventories must be unobservable
in order that wages are uniform. Wages will exhaust profits if firms have
free entry and the ability to attract a random selection of workers.
right-hand tail of the inventory distribution falls sufficiently fast.
From Section 3, we know that the right-hand tail flatten? as the capacity
utilization ratio increases. A priori, therefore, we expect that an
optimal equilibrium price will exist only if the capacity utilization ratio
z' does not exceed a critical maximum. As a corollary, we expect that the
higher the capacity utilization ratio, the higher the equilibrium price.
The same reasoning allows us to compare equilibrium prices for the two
different search technologies. We expect the more efficient technology A,
associated with a shorter right-hand tail, to result in a lower equilibrium
price.
Since we assume no collusion among firms, the derivative in (7.1) acts
only on the inventory level and does not take account of the structural
relationships between k* and z' derived in Section 6. The right hand side
of (7.1) is therefore simply minus the exponential rate constant k*
(cf.(3.4)), and we may write
k*p =
-p/(p-y). (7.2)
The system is in equilibrium when p satisfies (7.2), and k* simultaneously
satisfies (6.11b) for technology A, or (6.12) for technology B. By
combining (7.2) with (6.11b) and (6.12) respectively, we obtain pairs of
equations that relate the equilibrium price to the capacity utilization
ratio z'. For technology A, we have, defining U=p/(p-y),
z
1
= aV(b'y) = (l-e" U )/U. (7.3a)
For technology B,
z' = (l-e" U )(2-e 1_U )U" 2 . (7.3b)
Lemma 4. For both search technologies, there exists a unique equilibrium
if and only if the parametric condition
aV(b'y) < 1 - 1/e (7.4)
is satisfied.
Proof. The proof follows by observing, from (7.3), that z' is monotone
decreasing in U for both technologies, and takes its maximum value,
1-1/e, when U r l. From the monotonicity of z' in U, and the monotonicity of
U=p/(p-y) in p, it follows immediately that:
Lemma 5. For both search technologies, the optimal price p is a monotone
increasing function of the capacity utilization ratio a'/b'y.
The monotonicity of p excludes the existence of multiple equilibria
characterized by different prices but the same value of z'. We show the
behavior of the optimal price as a function of z' in Figure 5. Note the
singular behavior of p as z' approaches 1-1/e and also the higher equili-
brium price for technology B at each value of z' -- the comparative
behavior anticipated above.
To derive these monotonicity properties, one may sign and bound the
logarithmic derivatives of the right-hand sides of (7.3a,b). In the more
difficult case (7.3b), we have the logarithmic derivative
-U ri -U-,-1 1-UY- l-U-,-1 9/ll -Un -l-i-l 1-U 9/ll
e [1-e J + e L2-e J - 2/11 < e U-e J + e - 2/U.
The bound on the right side of this inequality is negative over the
relevant range U=p/(p-y)>L
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8. Conclusions
Using simple stochastic search models that permit explicit solutions,
we have explored the role of purchasing power in the determination of
steady state equilibria. In particular, we have examined the role of
economy-wide price setting as it affects the distribution of inventory
holdings, the aggregate level of inventories, and the aggregate
transactions rate. Simplicity is achieved by omitting many important
economic phenomena.
In sequels, we plan to study monetary models with the same structure,
as well as models incorporating interest paid on "deposits" of inventory.
In the interest models, we will introduce deaths and births, with "estates"
going to the government for redistribution. This will allow us to con-
struct models in which there are equilibrium steady states with a positive
interest rate. We will then modify the model of Section 6 to distinguish
wages from interest paid on inventories. In this way, we hope to analyze
the effects of price-wage-interest setting on the distribution of inventory
holdings, and therefore also on aggregate inventory levels and the aggre-
gate transactions rate. Once a model that includes interest rates is
constructed and solved, it should be possible to analyze a monetary economy
with alternative tradeable assets.
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Figure Captions
Figure 1. Probability density of inventory distribution defined by
equations (3.4,6) of text. Note the flattening and extension of the
right-hand tail as z increases.
Figure 2. Lifetime utility W as determined by dynamic programming
equations (4.3) of text, with parameters b=r=a/y. Inventory is measured in
units of commodity bundle size y.
Figure 3. Functions R, n(x) , as defined by equations (6.14) of text, for
the capacity utilization ratio z'=l/2. Shown is zero-profit root k£y=x of
Ri ( k Q.y)
= Ro(l<Qy). Note that this root lies to the right of the minimum in
R~(x), where dR~/dx is positive. Therefore, as shown in distorted scale in
inset, for p sufficiently small two values of p correspond to each root x
of R, (x)=R
?
(px/y) . Note that the derivative dx/dp is negative for p near y
and positive for large p, as shown explicitly in Figure 4.
Figure 4. Price behavior of k*y and k*p, as given by equation (6.13) of
text.
Figure 5. Optimum equilibrium prices as function of capacity utilization
ratio in many-firm model described in text. Curve A: efficient search
technology with instantaneous redirection of traders to adequately stocked
suppliers. Curve B: random search technology.
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